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Geoff Cox and Alex McLean
There is something inherently human about the ability to perform creative 
actions with verbal language expressed in the form of jokes. To Paolo Virno, 
jokes are not simply Freudian clues to the unconscious, but diagrams of 
innovative action that represent how humans can diverge from social norms.1 
This chapter argues for something similar in the way fun is had with software 
which exemplifies the innovative action of code in addressing software norms. 
This indeed is common in critical approaches to making software, where fun 
often indicates the use of irony or satiric humour by programmers to jolt the 
user out of their usual interactions with normative tools and productive work. 
But, as the distinction between work and play becomes ever more blurred, fun 
is an expected part of all kinds of serious production; indeed fun like most of 
lived experience has become subsumed into the ‘social factory’.
That fun can be had with software is demonstrated in the numerous titles 
that make explicit reference to it: for instance Fun with Computers by T. 
Ramasami, or the many examples of technical manuals that try to convince the 
user that things are far easier and more fun than the otherwise serious reality 
of coding. A quick search reveals numerous examples of this tendency: Fun and 
Games with the Computer by Edwin R. Sage; Fun with Computers by A. Roy 
Chowdhury; Fun with Computers and BASIC by Donald D. Spencer; Fun with 
Computer Electronics by Luann Colombo and Peter Georgeson; (and even more 
assertively) Computers are Fun by Tony Gray and Carl Billson; and The Fun of 
Programming by Jeremy Gibbons and Oege de Moor.2 Fun is a useful way of 
encouraging productive work with computers and viewing some of the under-
lying difficulties as enjoyable challenges. This is perhaps particularly noticeable 
with game development, exemplified by Raph Koster’s A Theory of Fun for 
Game Design, where the inherent fun of computer games is understood through 
cognitive science as ‘the feedback the brain gives us when we are observing 
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   157 03/04/2014   11:32
158 Fun and Software
patterns for learning purposes’, taking players beyond mere entertainment 
value and suggesting ‘alternatives to fun’.3 Deviating from the norm in this way 
is widely regarded as an essential part of the process of capitalist innovation as 
well as its critique; fun in this sense seems to have become instrumentalized.
A further example is Linus Torvalds’s book title Just for Fun: The Story of an 
Accidental Revolutionary, written with David Diamond, which is part autobi-
ography and at the same time charts the serious development of the GNU/
Linux operating system.4 The development of the Linux kernel makes a good 
case study as it emerges from a culture of sharing across code repositories 
and software distribution networks, like sharing a good joke. Yet this is to be 
expected as the history of sharing is as old as the sharing of recipes, as Richard 
Stallman puts it, ‘as old as computers, just as the sharing of recipes is as old as 
cooking’.5 With free software development, each individual’s work is valued in 
the context of the multiple efforts of all contributors, indeed it emphasizes that 
innovation and value creation need to account for a deeper understanding of 
collaborative processes and the social relations that arise from these cultures of 
sharing.
This point is also what Adrian Mackenzie develops when he claims that the 
Linux kernel represents a particularly unstable relation to commodified software 
and hardware as performative action. He thinks that the way in which Linux is 
produced and continually changed cannot be separated from its performative 
structure as code, and describes it as a performative ‘speech act’ that produces 
an uncertain relation between the code object (the Linux kernel) and the code 
subject (the programmers who use it), and thus challenges its property relations 
and corporate relations of production.6 It diverges from the software norm and 
innovates in ways that follow the logic of free software development. Fun in this 
case coexists with the serious business of making source code freely available 
and open to further modifications. But rather than declaring development 
by accident in the case of Torvalds, this chapter makes reference to Virno’s 
conception of jokes as an expression of innovative actions drawn from the 
kernel of political possibilities across human and program languages. Thus the 
chapter is a speculation on the source code of (software) jokes, and explores this 
at the intersection of human and machine interpretation.
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On jokes
The point for Virno is not the content of jokes, but that newly invented forms 
diverge from established rules and perceived norms as a result of the innate 
creativity embedded in language itself. The chapter extends this to program 
language, to coding practices and, in particular, the ways that code jokes most 
often do not operate within the confines of formal language, but either outside 
it in comments, variable names and layout (as with code poetry or codeworks) 
or in the development of playful esoteric languages (such as brainfuck and 
befunge, which will be introduced later). It is not that jokes are embedded in 
the machine’s unconscious, of course, but that jokes can be based on innovative 
deviations from the conventions of coding practices and their formal expression 
and interpretation.
Before discussing Virno’s ideas in more depth, it is worth considering some 
other commentaries on jokes and the phenomenon of humour from the wider 
sources at hand. There are far too many to mention but Sigmund Freud’s reflec-
tions on jokes and the ‘wittiness’ of dreams is clearly an important reference. In 
The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, first written in 1905, Freud draws 
upon his theory of the unconscious to explore the idea that jokes express hidden 
desires and fantasies.7 Joke-work, like dream-work, is thereby understood 
as a means of negotiating the ways that consciousness censors and disguises 
intellectual processes. Joke techniques of condensation, displacement, repre-
sentation by absurdity or by the opposite, indirect representation, and so on 
are all present in dreams. But whereas the dream is asocial and serves to spare 
displeasure, jokes are distinctly social and operate to gain pleasure by releasing 
inhibitions and discharging excess energy through laughter which involves 
the whole body. Both share the complex workings of the psyche that does not 
express itself by accident even when appearing to mash up ideas or develop an 
operating system. This social aspect of jokes is crucial.
Writing more recently, the philosopher Simon Critchley has examined 
the importance of humour, emphasizing how a change of situation exerts a 
powerful critical function, of particular relevance to creative practices. In an 
interview for Cabinet magazine in 2005, drawing upon his book On Humour 
(2002), he emphasizes humour as a social practice that reveals wider social 
insights.8 Repression is clearly part of this, with the example given from Plato’s 
Republic where it is explained that the guardians of the polis were not meant to 
laugh because laughter was considered too uncivilized and bestial. It is because 
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laughter is considered deviant that jokes are seen to exhibit the potential to be 
a powerful critical tool.
Yet Critchley also explains how witticism (as a sophisticated style of humour) 
is also considered to be a sign of advanced civilization as opposed to common 
jokes, where witticism is tied to the development of liberal democracy, and 
characterized by the figure of the dandy or wit. The witticisms of Slavoj 
Žižek seem to exemplify this, including his many jokes related to the subject 
of really xisting Socialism.9 One example he gives is a joke that reveals the 
futility of dissident protest and the lack of recognition of wider conditions. 
His claim is that no one really took the subject of totalitarianism seriously but 
rather as a joke; and that progressive intellectuals who thought it was serious 
merely indicated the futility of their protests. As we can see from the above, 
the function of humour for Žižek lies in its ability to invert common sense, 
following the Marxist-Hegelian logic of dialectical reversal. Moreover, concep-
tualizes such things in terms of the ‘return of the real’ (reworking Freud’s ‘return 
of the repressed’), where impulses previously repressed erupt into social life at 
unexpected moments and confound previously held certainties. This explains 
how we laugh in bad taste, and as a way of coping with the disappointment of 
our lived realities. Can we also ask whether anyone really thinks Windows or 
Mac OSX are serious operating systems in similar terms? Or indeed, that their 
free software alternatives are rendered as jokes too (to counter seriousness), 
and reveal their futility as they in turn become commercialized (as in the case 
of Ubuntu perhaps)?
The point we are making is that it is possible to draw some analogies between 
jokes and code, as witty utterances hidden behind the surface of normative 
software production and totalitarian server-client architectures that really are 
a joke. This issue is also explored in Inke Arns’s essay, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, 
Execute_Me’, with its subtitle ‘Software and its Discontents’,10 implying that 
the performative dimension of code lies repressed, as with the description of 
the Linux kernel cited earlier,11 and further evoking Freud’s Civilisation and its 
Discontents, that capitalism was founded on the repression of the libido. In post-
Marxist thinking (where the constitution of subjectivity is considered more 
fully), something similar can be detected in the way that repression is considered 
to be socially determined and can only be released by freeing productive desire, 
perhaps expressed as nervous laughter. Drawing these threads together in the 
1970s, Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation and, to a greater extent, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia argue 
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for the liberatory potential of desiring-production.12 So in this way the release 
of free software can be understood as less an imaginary force based on lack (as 
in Freud), and more a real, productive force, as a neat example of a ‘desiring-
machine..13 A good example of this is perhaps Gordan Savičić and Danja 
Vasiliev’s project 120days of *buntu which proposes 120 modified humorous 
and useless Ubuntu Operating Systems.14 By making playful reference to de 
Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom, the suggestion is that alternative operating 
systems might be able to liberate desire, in excess of the masochistic desires of 
free/libre software development in which Ubuntu is seen to operate too close 
to normativity.15
Similarly, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi detects the fundamental political struggle 
between machines for liberating desire and mechanisms of control over the 
imaginary.16 Thus, to Berardi the various liberatory strategies such as refusal of 
work, the invention of temporary autonomous zones, free software initiatives 
and so on offer ‘dynamic recombination’.17 Therefore, and further developing 
the analogy between repression and the performativity of software, free software 
development (where the code is made openly available/shared) might offer 
Figure 7.1 Sample of logos from Gordan Savičić and Danja Vasiliev’s 120days of 
*buntu (2011)
Source http://120buntu.com/
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therapeutic assistance in putting the programmer in touch with his/her, and 
indeed culture’s, sublimated desires repressed under proprietary software devel-
opment.18 If normative software could be thought of as software without a body, 
might desiring-production be explored through free software development with 
a body? As Christopher M. Kelty describes it, ‘geeks’ share a social imaginary 
about the production of actually existing alternatives, and as such the free 
software movement is an example of a ‘recursive public’, capable of creating and 
modifying the domain or platform through which they act.19 In other words, 
they share a culture through which their repressed desires find release in the 
public domain and body politic.
The ideology of the Free Software Foundation clarifies this point with a 
humorous play on the ambiguity of freedom in ‘you should think of ‘free’ as in 
“free speech”, not as in “free beer”’.20 Commercial (free market) interests seek 
to assert their control over free software by replacing the word ‘free’ with the 
phrase ‘open source’, placing emphasis on visibility of code rather than freedom 
to share.21 Moreover, the broader ideological issues are evident in the parallel 
narratives of the development of free and open source software development. 
On the one hand, there is free software referring back to the 1980s when 
software freedom was meant in resistance to proprietary software, and on the 
other, open source that emanated from arguments about its economic benefits 
and in parallel to free market thinking. Furthermore, like the joke from Žižek, 
the futility of progressive alternatives like Ubuntu run the risk of missing the 
mark unless the broader political issue of the ability to modify the domain or 
platform through which these desiring-practices are enacted is also considered.
That freedom of speech relates to free software (at least according to the 
Free Software Foundation), and not free beer, may be one of the analogies that 
leads commentators (such as Mackenzie) to discuss the performative dimension 
of software and its relation to speech act theory, making reference to John 
Langshaw Austin’s How To Do Things With Words.22 Although the analogy 
between program code and speech acts has become rather commonplace 
since it was made by Terry Winogrand and Fernando Flores in 1987,23 and is 
perhaps left a little general here, the point is to emphasize the ways in which 
programmers express themselves through the witty manipulation of layers of 
representation, including symbols, then words, language and notation. But 
clearly code is a special kind of language, and one that can automatically enable 
and disable certain kinds of actions.24 It does this through its special ability to 
convert action to language and this is where the joke lies.
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Also drawing on Austin, Virno refers to linguistic innovation as: ‘how to do 
new things with words’, where words constitute an action in and of themselves 
– like program code in as much as when it is interpreted it says something and 
does something at the same time. Virno’s interest is in the ability of the human 
animal to execute ‘innovative actions’ capable of modifying ‘consolidated 
norms’.25 A key reference underpinning this is Noam Chomsky’s description of 
the apparatus of power as repressing the innate creativity of verbal language, and 
to Aristotle’s description of contingency at the heart of our use of language (in 
Ethics),26 as well as the more general point that intellectual and linguistic labour 
are no longer separated from general conditions of informational capitalism. 
In Virno’s opinion, rhetorical persuasion and the concept of the public sphere 
in which speech is paramount, demonstrate the ability of language to establish 
social relations between a ‘mass of speakers’, that is necessarily shared and 
collective.27 He emphasizes that the ‘language system is a social fact’ wherein 
the human animal is ‘ready made for language, but not actually in possession 
of it’ until it starts interacting in the social realm.28 This is part of early years 
development (the ‘mirror stage’, in Lacanian terms) but remains evident in every 
utterance made thereafter. For Virno, this confirms the biopolitical dimension 
of the human animal in the world, and the social importance of language and 
the sharing of codes.
According to Virno, underpinning political possibilities is the simple fact 
that the human animal is capable of modifying its forms of life.29 This is what 
makes for innovation in the general sense that newly invented forms might 
diverge from established rules and perceived norms – based on the Chomskian 
innate creativity referred to above, and perhaps also to the idea that jokes 
can be understood as hard-wired (in as much as creativity relates to playing 
with language). And this is where jokes also figure as an example of how 
humans diverge from social norms, how ‘linguistic animals give evidence of 
an unexpected derivation from their normal praxis’, as Virno puts it.30 For 
him, witty utterances are similar to the performative utterances that Austin 
described, where words constitute an action in and of themselves.31 But as 
already emphasized, the point for Virno is not the content of jokes, which might 
poke fun at social norms, hierarchies or the ruling order, for such jokes tend to 
obscure what is important: the apparatus or the ‘logicolinguistic resources that 
jokes utilize’.32 His argument is that innovative action uses these resources like a 
toolbox or library. In this way, it produces ambivalences: oscillating between the 
‘determined rule and the regularity of species-specific forms of conduct’.33 Such 
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contradictory factors characterize the social character of the human species and 
its innovative force, despite its repression by power structures. In other words, 
jokes demonstrate innovative techniques and the possibilities for transforming 
the linguistic operating system. This happens in two main ways according to 
Virno: first by demonstrating how divergences in following rules often result 
in changing the rule itself (put differently the application of the norm also 
contains surprises, and situations where the rule is broken and justified in 
terms of exceptional circumstances34); and secondly, through the incorrect use 
of semantic ambiguity, an ‘error’ (or glitch).35 The rules are not only there to 
be broken, but applied differently, adapted and modified, and ultimately trans-
formed. So how does software demonstrate similar possibilities at the level of 
code, and where the modifications undermine normalized behaviour?
Code jokes
It would be relatively easy to mention the use of parody in this connection to 
software, but perhaps this is too predictable under present conditions and its 
effectiveness thereby questionable in a similar manner to a political joke that fails 
to register its wider effects once executed. So although an example like Gordan 
Savičić’s sing_slavoj_sing might poke fun at the seriousness of Žižek’s philoso-
phizing, by hacking billy the fish and replacing the soundchip with a good quote 
or two, this is not the kind of joke that we wish to emphasize for our argument 
as it does not present an intervention in terms of the apparatus of language.36 
If humour is somewhat hard-wired, then jokes are an inevitable component of 
the structures of language where humans demonstrate their innate ability to 
innovate new forms. But can code jokes be reduced to their functional aspects 
in this way, as procedures that are open to recombination as language is more 
generally? Our concern is about jokes at the level of changing rules and the use 
of semantic ambiguity, in keeping with Virno’s emphasis thus far.
Such tendencies can be detected in the example of Signwave’s Auto-Illustrator, 
an experimental, semi-autonomous, generative software artwork that includes 
a wide range of generative and procedural techniques, packaged as a fully 
functioning parody of Adobe’s vector graphics application Illustrator.37 Humour 
is an important part of the software package as indicated, not least, by the release 
date of version 1.2 on April Fool’s Day, in 2003. The new release included parody 
plug-ins that serve to question how contemporary software should ‘behave’, 
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Figures 7.1 and 7.2 Screenshots of Signwave’s Auto-Illustrator (2001): ‘Dicshunary’ 
spelling tool and ‘Psychosis’ preferences option
Source http://swai.signwave.co.uk
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including one function that would shut the computer down with no notice if 
the software ‘decided’ the design was unworthy. The user’s expectations were 
challenged by presenting tools and functions that do not conform to expectations 
of what software usually does as a tool. Perhaps most controversial was the terms 
of use which insisted that designs using the software were co-credited to the author 
and the software company. This caused some outrage by users who assumed the 
company were overstepping their proprietary rights and imposing measures 
beyond a joke. Yet, to Signwave, this seemed to be an entirely logical statement 
which recognized the difficulties of making any claim of single authorship, and 
moreover exemplified the principle that the making of software can be regarded 
as an artwork in itself. Thus Signwave extended some of the ambiguities built into 
software production into a playful form that relates to the way social relations 
are organized with normative software development. If Auto-illustrator’s satire of 
Adobe’s Illustrator operates at the level of code in a general sense – in the domain 
of intellectual property within the legal system, itself a system of rules, codes and 
speech acts – could this also work in the domain of source code?
To repeat the Virno formulation, jokes are identified as operating in two 
significant ways: first by demonstrating how divergences in following syntac-
tical rules often generate a change in the rule itself; and secondly, through 
the ironic use of semantic ambiguity. This perhaps happens in a general way 
with Auto-illustrator, but how do these ideas translate to code more precisely? 
In this sense, it could be said that we wish to crack the source code of jokes 
by examining the concept of interpretation in more detail. The interpreter is 
a codification of the language in which the source code is expressed, or, in 
other words, a partially evaluated computational process.38 The source code 
is not a program on its own, rather it is a replaceable component of a larger 
computation. The relationship between source code and interpreter is recursive; 
the rules behind an interpreter are themselves implemented in source code, 
requiring another interpreter. If we follow these recursive layers of interpre-
tation we find hardware microcode that mediates between the discrete digital 
world and our continuous physical world.
With few exceptions, mainstream programming languages are Turing-
complete. This means it is possible to write a program in any of the languages 
that interprets any other computer language. Therefore the rules of any language 
can be changed simply by writing an interpreter for another language within 
it; and thereby the scope for breaking rules is boundless. Turing-completeness 
extends beyond mainstream language into some surprising places. Simple 
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cellular automata, including the well-known Game of Life by John Conway and 
Stephen Wolfram’s Rule 110,39 even some configuration files such as that of the 
‘sendmail’ electronic mail transport software, have turned out to be Turing-
complete. The fact that Turing-completeness comes so easily to these invented 
languages, allowing any symbolic constraint to be broken at will, provides a 
programmer’s playground with glimpses of the infinite.
With this emphasis on breaking rules, it is no surprise that source code 
humour centres on interpretation of code. Esoteric programming languages 
are those which take a humourous approach to language design, challenging 
the norms of source code interpretation. For example, obfuscated programs 
written in the brainfuck language consist entirely of punctuation, each of the 
eight characters ‘><+-.,[]’ representing a single elementary operation. Brainfuck 
is Turing-complete, and so can be used to write any program in theory, but in 
practice it is extremely difficult to write any program in it at all. Below is The 
Game Of Life implemented in brainfuck.40
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A comment on the left side of the web page where the program is posted, simply 
states ‘get a Life);’.
The tortuous nature of brainfuck escapes the world of computation to 
be wrought on the human body as bodyfuck, a brainfuck interpreter using 
computer vision techniques to map from bodily gestures to the brainfuck 
instructionset (like a desiring-machine). The brainfuck demo shows how much 
physical exertion is required to produce a short sequence of symbols,41 and 
the programmer uses his/her body in a more overt manner than previously 
required. To take another example, befunge is an esoteric language that breaks 
the usual downward direction of interpretation through a program to create 
two-dimensional syntax. This is done using punctuation, as in brainfuck but 
in a more understandable way; each of the four instructions ‘^>v<’ represent 
graphical arrows, which change the direction of control flow as you might 
expect. The question mark character ‘?’ changes the direction in a random 
direction. The instruction set goes beyond this, and is again Turing-complete, 
but by following the arrows we can already understand the operation of the 
following program, which, when read starting from the top left-hand corner, 
outputs a random number from 0 to 9:
vv < <
 2
 ^ v<
v1<?>3v4
 ^ ^
> >?> ?>5^
 v v
v9<?>7v6
 v v<
 8
. > > ^
^<
Despite being Turing-complete these interpreters appear useless, and some 
esoteric languages seem to exist simply as ‘in jokes’ for geeks, having unimple-
mentable instruction sets. In the case of IRP (Internet Relay Programming) 
there is no formal instruction set at all, the interpreters are human participants 
in an internet chat room, a running joke since 2005. Below is the obligatory 
‘Hello, World!’ example:
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<GregorR>  Please say ‘Hello, World!’
<jix>  Hello, World!
The likelihood of an IRP program being interpreted as you wish is improved if 
you are polite, however this does not always work:
<GregorR>   Please, write the lyrics to the song 99 Bottles of Beer on 
the Wall.
<memonic>  go to hell
Recursion is possible, up to a point:
<CakeProphet>   Could someone please ask someone to repeat this request?
<pikhq> Could someone please repeat the previous request?
<RodgerTheGreat>  Could someone please ask someone to repeat this request?
In recasting English as a machine language and humans as interpreters, we 
are given the opportunity to examine the relationship between performative 
phrases and computer code in some detail. In this way, we might begin to 
understand that jokes can be interpreted in multiple ways which reflect the 
complexity of human and machine logic that moves beyond simple amusement. 
Indeed all jokes express a purpose. As in Virno’s earlier descriptions, this is 
where innovative techniques are demonstrated that diverge from established 
conventions by changing and breaking rules, and playing with ambiguities 
related to code. This is where other possibilities reside.
But is software development taken too seriously when it is a joke all along? 
Indeed software development is in danger of losing its sense of humour 
altogether as it becomes more and more standardized and packaged. For 
instance, with service-based platforms access to source code is no longer 
possible, and the differentiation between files, software and network services 
evaporates altogether. This is an apt description of the Apple iOS paradigm of 
software development, where users of the Apple iPad and iPhone are allowed 
only restricted access to programming language interpreters, and software 
licenses favoured by the Free Software Foundation are forbidden. Access to 
humour is denied and the example confirms that proprietary logic is a serious 
business of repression. In Berardi’s terms, interpretation has become schizo-
phrenic (like fast speech), and the relations between metaphors and things, 
representation and life, have become thoroughly confused. This is particu-
larly evident when it comes to language that is more and more influenced by 
machines, leading to a situation where the learning of language and affectivity 
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have been separated.42 On the contrary, what needs to be rediscovered are forms 
of happiness and laughter tied to collective formations: the sharing of code that 
liberates desire and mechanisms of control over the imaginary from the serious 
business and sense of determinism that is normally associated with code.43
The reference to Virno’s work on jokes draws attention to their function in 
relation to ‘innovative action’ in the public sphere. In the case of the title of 
this chapter, the use of ‘not’ as prefix to Torvald’s title (in ‘not just for fun’) is in 
keeping with Virno’s comments that the system of language both ‘does’ negation 
(by identifying what something is not), and ‘is’ negation (in as much as it can 
only signify something): ‘The negation, or something that language does, is 
understood, above all, as something that language is’.44 He is speculating here on 
a non-representational form of politics, and despite recognizing the sovereign 
forces that restrain such abilities, concludes that humans are capable of adapting 
themselves and their circumstances in parallel to their linguistic abilities and 
possibilities for innovative action. We have attempted to consider the execution 
of program code in similar terms; that the potential for divergent forms comes 
into existence through social interactions and modifications. Rules are not just 
there to be broken, but transformed altogether through negation. For instance, 
the function of humour (to Žižek) lies in its ability to invert common sense. 
Code jokes remind us of the possibilities of non-deterministic interpretation 
in this inverse way, as deviations from the conventions of coding as formal 
expression. What we mean to stress is that having fun with software does not 
simply encourage people to work with computers (and distract them from the 
hard work that is unavoidable when programming) but offers a way to rethink 
political possibilities in public, and to reimagine the seriousness of normative 
visions of life that code otherwise implies. 
Notes
1 Virno, Paolo, Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation, trans. Isabella 
Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andre Casson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) Foreign 
Agents, 2008).
2 This issue of fun is also something that Christopher M. Kelty raised in his talk 
‘No Fun. Work, Labor, Action in Free Software’, presented at ‘The Internet as 
Playground and Factory Conference’, Eugene Lang College, The New School, New 
York (12–14 November 2009), http://digitallabor.org/. His presentation slides 
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   170 03/04/2014   11:32
 Not Just for Fun 171
can be seen online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22394057/No-Fun-Slides (all 
accessed 12.12.2013).
3 Cited in Bogost, Ian, ‘An Alternative to Fun’, in Unit Operations (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006), 118.
4 Torvalds, Linus, Just for Fun: The Story of an Accidental Revolutionary (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2001), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_for_Fun (accessed 
12.12.2013).
5 Stallman, Richard, Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. 
Stallman, ed. Joshua Gay (Boston, MA: Free Software Foundation, 2002), 15.
6 Mackenzie, Adrian, ‘The Performativity of Code: Software and Cultures of 
Circulation’, in Theory, Culture & Society, 22(1): 13.
7 Freud, Sigmund, The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious (London: Penguin, 
2002).
8 Dillon, Brian and Simon Critchley, ‘Very Funny: An Interview with Simon 
Critchley’, in Laughter, Cabinet, 17 (spring 2005), http://www.cabinetmagazine.
org/issues/17/dillon.php (accessed 12.12.2013).
9 In this connection, it is well worth watching his performance in a clip from 
YouTube where he tells an old Russian joke, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=XEnkDEgALGI (accessed 12.12.2013).
10 Arns, Inke, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, Execute_Me: Software and Its Discontents, or: 
It’s The Performativity of Code, Stupid’, in Read_Me: Software Art & Cultures 
– Edition 2004, (eds) Olga Goriunova and Alexei Shulgin, 176–93 (Aarhus, 
Denmark: Digital Aesthetics Research Centre, Aarhus University, 2004).
11 See note 6.
12 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1990).
13 Ibid.
14 Savičić, Gordan and Vasiliev, Danja,120 days of *buntu (2011), http://120buntu.
com/ (accessed 12.12.2013).
15 See Cox, Geoff, ‘Notes on 120 days of *buntu’, in World of the News, (eds) 
Geoff Cox and Christian Ulrik Andersen (Berlin/Aarhus: transmediale/DARC, 
2012), 9.
16 Berardi, Franco ‘Bifo’, Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of 
the Post-alpha Generation (London: Minor Compositions, 2009). His performative 
reading of the source code of the ‘I Love You’ virus resonates with this description; 
he read the source code of the virus at the D-I-N-A (Digital Is Not Analog) digital 
art festival in 2001, http://www.digitalcraft.org/iloveyou/loveletter_reading.htm 
(accessed 12.12.2013).
17 Ibid., 72.
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   171 03/04/2014   11:32
172 Fun and Software
18 In French, free software is known as ‘libre’ software. Although it does not have an 
analogue in English, this unambiguous term evokes a libertarian attitude.
19 Kelty, Christopher M. Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
20 See http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html. This was made into more of a 
joke by the Danish artists Superflex in their project Free Beer, in which they share 
recipes for free beer, http://www.superflex.net/projects/freebeer/ (both accessed 
31–3–88).
21 Releasing and sharing source code therefore represents a number of ambiguities 
relating to trust, cost, liberty, making free but making money on the stock market 
instead, a belief in open standards or a cynical business move to capitalize on free 
labour.
22 Austin, John Langshaw, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962). For an elaboration of this, see Cox, Geoff and Alex 
McLean, Speaking Code: Coding as Aesthetic and Political Expression (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2011).
23 Winograd, Terry and Flores, Fernando, Understanding Computers and Cognition: 
A New Foundation for Design (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1987).
24 Chun, Wendy, Programmed Visions: Software and Memory (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2011), 27.
25 Virno, Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation, 20.
26 Ibid., 13.
27 Ibid., 46.
28 Ibid., 47.
29 Ibid., 69.
30 Ibid., 72.
31 Ibid., 85.
32 Ibid., 165.
33 Ibid., 166.
34 The so-called ‘state of exception’, invoking Carl Schmitt, to describe the way the 
state legitimates the breaking of its own legal rules in exceptional circumstances. 
According to Giorgio Agamben, this has become the working paradigm of 
modern government.
35 Ibid., 73, 74.
36 sing_slavoj_sing was developed for DEVICE-ART Zagreb, by fleshgordo (Gordan 
Savičić) in 2006. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9FXyr-LLeI (accessed 
12.12.2013).
37 See http://swai.signwave.co.uk/ (accessed 12.12.2013).
 See Signwave, Auto-Illustrator Users Guide (first written 2001), published to 
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   172 03/04/2014   11:32
 Not Just for Fun 173
coincide with the boxed set as part of the Generator exhibition, Spacex 2002–03, 
and touring in the UK.
38 Futamura, Yoshihiko, ‘Partial Evaluation of Computation Pprocess – An Approach 
to a Compiler-compiler’, in Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation, 12(4) (1999): 
381–91, http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=609205 (accessed 12.12.2013).
39 John Conway’s Game of Life is a cellular automaton devised in 1970, consisting 
of a collection of cells which, based on a few mathematical rules, can live, die or 
multiply. See http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/ (accessed 12.12.2013).
 Similarly Stephen Wolfram’s Rule 110 is an elementary cellular automaton 
with interesting behaviour on the boundary between stability and chaos that is 
considered to be Turing-complete, meaning that in principle, any calculation 
or computer program can be simulated using this automaton. See http://www.
wolframalpha.com/input/?i=rule+110 (accessed 12.12.2013).
40 Akesson, Linus, The Game of Life implemented in brainfuck, http://www.
linusakesson.net/programming/brainfuck/index.php (accessed 12.12.2013).
41 See http://www.nikhanselmann.com/projects/bodyfuck/ (accessed 12.12.2013).
42 Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody, 9.
43 As our smiles are clearly not simply fixed like George Maciunas’ Flux Smile 
Machine (1971), a device that forces the shape of the user’s mouth into a smile. 
This work was the reference point for the exhibition Smile Machines, curated by 
Anne-Marie Duguet, for the Transmediale Festival for Digital Culture, in 2006.
44 Virno, Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation, 50.
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   173 03/04/2014   11:32
9781623560942_txt_print.indd   174 03/04/2014   11:32
